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docs(hooks): clarify trust model and audit guidance

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Peter Steinberger
2026-03-17 09:54:19 -07:00
parent 2145eb5908
commit 6636ca87f4
4 changed files with 8 additions and 3 deletions
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docs/cli/security.md
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@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ This is for cooperative/shared inbox hardening. A single Gateway shared by mutua
It also emits `security.trust_model.multi_user_heuristic` when config suggests likely shared-user ingress (for example open DM/group policy, configured group targets, or wildcard sender rules), and reminds you that OpenClaw is a personal-assistant trust model by default.
For intentional shared-user setups, the audit guidance is to sandbox all sessions, keep filesystem access workspace-scoped, and keep personal/private identities or credentials off that runtime.
It also warns when small models (`<=300B`) are used without sandboxing and with web/browser tools enabled.
For webhook ingress, it warns when `hooks.defaultSessionKey` is unset, when request `sessionKey` overrides are enabled, and when overrides are enabled without `hooks.allowedSessionKeyPrefixes`.
For webhook ingress, it warns when `hooks.token` reuses the Gateway token, when `hooks.defaultSessionKey` is unset, when `hooks.allowedAgentIds` is unrestricted, when request `sessionKey` overrides are enabled, and when overrides are enabled without `hooks.allowedSessionKeyPrefixes`.
It also warns when sandbox Docker settings are configured while sandbox mode is off, when `gateway.nodes.denyCommands` uses ineffective pattern-like/unknown entries (exact node command-name matching only, not shell-text filtering), when `gateway.nodes.allowCommands` explicitly enables dangerous node commands, when global `tools.profile="minimal"` is overridden by agent tool profiles, when open groups expose runtime/filesystem tools without sandbox/workspace guards, and when installed extension plugin tools may be reachable under permissive tool policy.
It also flags `gateway.allowRealIpFallback=true` (header-spoofing risk if proxies are misconfigured) and `discovery.mdns.mode="full"` (metadata leakage via mDNS TXT records).
It also warns when sandbox browser uses Docker `bridge` network without `sandbox.browser.cdpSourceRange`.