From a6fda67663e158d0f0c1384599a2084724249577 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Riyaz Faizullabhoy Date: Tue, 2 Aug 2016 10:27:30 -0700 Subject: [PATCH] Merge pull request #893 from docker/docs-typo fix access typos, close 833 (cherry picked from commit 41c5dd3248dfeee0213b104b0cfc95b473164ec1) --- docs/service_architecture.md | 2 +- trustmanager/yubikey/yubikeystore.go | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/docs/service_architecture.md b/docs/service_architecture.md index 9d79db9ed6..88582cdf2b 100644 --- a/docs/service_architecture.md +++ b/docs/service_architecture.md @@ -344,7 +344,7 @@ decrypted key depends on the type and combination of keys that were compromised No other keys are needed, since the attacker can just any rotate or all of them to ones that they generate. With these keys, they can set up a mirror to serve malicious data - any malicious data - at all, given that they have acess to all the keys. + at all, given that they have access to all the keys. - **Decrypted Root Key + none or any combination of decrypted keys + Notary Service write-capable credentials** diff --git a/trustmanager/yubikey/yubikeystore.go b/trustmanager/yubikey/yubikeystore.go index 0d351bdeb7..a9ad7c2746 100644 --- a/trustmanager/yubikey/yubikeystore.go +++ b/trustmanager/yubikey/yubikeystore.go @@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ type yubikeySigner struct { } // NewYubiPrivateKey returns a YubiPrivateKey, which implements the data.PrivateKey -// interface except that the private material is inacessible +// interface except that the private material is inaccessible func NewYubiPrivateKey(slot []byte, pubKey data.ECDSAPublicKey, passRetriever notary.PassRetriever) *YubiPrivateKey {