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docs: add io_uring_* syscalls to seccomp significant syscalls table
The io_uring_enter, io_uring_register, and io_uring_setup syscalls were removed from Docker's default seccomp allowlist in moby/moby#46762 due to security vulnerabilities that can be exploited to escape containers. Add them to the significant blocked syscalls table. Fixes #23784
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@@ -71,6 +71,9 @@ the reason each syscall is blocked rather than white-listed.
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| `init_module` | Deny manipulation and functions on kernel modules. Also gated by `CAP_SYS_MODULE`. |
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| `ioperm` | Prevent containers from modifying kernel I/O privilege levels. Already gated by `CAP_SYS_RAWIO`. |
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| `iopl` | Prevent containers from modifying kernel I/O privilege levels. Already gated by `CAP_SYS_RAWIO`. |
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| `io_uring_enter` | Blocked due to security vulnerabilities that can be exploited to break out of containers. See [moby/moby#46762](https://github.com/moby/moby/pull/46762). |
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| `io_uring_register` | Blocked due to security vulnerabilities that can be exploited to break out of containers. See [moby/moby#46762](https://github.com/moby/moby/pull/46762). |
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| `io_uring_setup` | Blocked due to security vulnerabilities that can be exploited to break out of containers. See [moby/moby#46762](https://github.com/moby/moby/pull/46762). |
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| `kcmp` | Restrict process inspection capabilities, already blocked by dropping `CAP_SYS_PTRACE`. |
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| `kexec_file_load` | Sister syscall of `kexec_load` that does the same thing, slightly different arguments. Also gated by `CAP_SYS_BOOT`. |
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| `kexec_load` | Deny loading a new kernel for later execution. Also gated by `CAP_SYS_BOOT`. |
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